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Abstract
We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with
several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided
matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching
market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we
put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit.
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A large set of literature contributing to the theory of incentives analyses optimal contracts
in principal-agent relationships when there exist asymmetries of information. When this
asymmetry concerns an action, or a decision to be made by an agent, a moral hazard prob-
lem emerges. Several works analyse optimal contracts when only one principal and one
agent interact, including the seminal works by Pauly[17], Mirrlees [15], and Harris and Ra-
viv[11]. The principal-agent contracts involve the provision of incentives and typically lead
to ineciency due to the informational asymmetry.
The main goal of this paper is to propose a useful framework to analyse the relationship
between each principal-agent pair not as an isolated entity but as a part of an entire market
where several principals and agents interact. In this framework, the utilities obtained by
each principal and each agent are determined endogenously in the market. This allows us
to improve over the previous approach where the agents' utilities are exogenously given and
the principals assume all the bargaining power. We consider the simultaneous determination
of the identity of the parties who meet (i.e., which agent is contracted by which principal)
and the contracts they sign in an environment where each relationship is subject to moral
hazard.1
We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game. An outcome of
this economy is an endogenous matching and a set of contracts, one for each principal-agent
pair under the matching. Roughly speaking, an outcome is said to be stable if there is no
individual or no relevant pair objecting the existing outcome. The paper studies the set
stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market.
In particular, we consider an economy with several identical principals and several agents
dierentiated only with respect to their initial wealth. A pair of individuals, one principal
and one agent, can enter into a relationship by signing a contract. This contract species the
1Ackerberg and Botticini [1] provide empirical evidence for endogenous matching in determining the
contract forms in tenancy relationships.
3contingent payments that are to be made by the agent. Also it sets the level of investment,
which together with a non-veriable eort made by the agent, determines the probability of
having a high return from the project the agent operates on. The initial wealth of the agent
may not cover the amount to be invested and hence, the wealth dierences imply dierences
in liability.
We begin by providing a complete characterisation of the set of stable outcomes of the
principal-agent economy. The rst simple property we prove is that all the principals earn
the same prot in a stable outcome. In particular, if the principals constitute the long side of
the market, their prots are zero. The second feature is that the contracts oered in a stable
outcome are optimal, i.e., it is not possible to increase the utility level of the principal without
making the agent strictly worse-o. More interestingly, in a stable outcome, the matching
itself is ecient, in the sense that it is the one that maximises productive eciency. For
example, if the agents are in the long side of the market, only the wealthier ones, i.e., the
more attractive ones are matched. Third, the productive eciency of a contract signed in a
stable outcome increases with the wealth of a matched agent. That is, the richer the agent,
closer his contract to the rst-best. The additional surplus generated due to this increase
in eciency accrues to the agent. Finally, the contracts signed in a stable outcome of this
economy are more ecient than principal-agent contracts, i.e., the contracts signed when
the principals assume all the bargaining power.
The previous characteristics of the set of stable outcomes have very relevant policy impli-
cations when applied to particular environments. For example, consider an economy where
landowners (principals) contract with tenants (agents) who are subject to limited liability.
Suppose that the government would like to improve the situations of the tenants by endow-
ing the agents with some additional money. Our analysis suggests that the government will
be interested in creating wealth asymmetries among tenants since otherwise, the landowners
would appropriate all the incremental surplus intended to the tenants.
From the point of view of matching theory, one can see our model as a generalisation of
4the assignment game with several buyers and sellers described by Shapley and Shubik[23].2
In the current model, a relationship is established through a contingent contract, rather than
a price. The rst distinguishing feature is that the surplus of each principal-agent pair, in
our model, is determined endogenously. Next, the utility cannot be transferred between a
principal and an agent on a one-to-one basis. In other words, unlike the assignment game,
our model is a non-transferable utility game.
We consolidate stability as a reasonable solution concept for this principal-agent matching
market by proposing a simple mechanism in which each of the agents proposes a contract and
each principal chooses an agent. We show that the equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism
coincide with the set of stable outcomes of the matching market.
Serfes[22] analyses an economy where the agents have dierent attitudes towards risk and
the principals own assets which are subject to dierent exogenous variability. He also models
the economy as a two-sided matching game and characterises the stable outcome where the
principals have all the bargaining power. In his model, a principal-agent pair cannot block
an outcome with any contract, rather it is the principal who proposes a contract once a
blocking pair is formed. The predictions of the model by Serfes[22] are dierent from those
of the standard risk model where an isolated principal-agent pair is studied. In particular,
there can be a positive, negative, or non-monotonic relationship between risk and incentives.
A few other papers study agency problems with several principals and agents. In a ten-
ancy relation Shetty[24], and Ray and Singh [19] propose a model where a set of principals
compete for a continuum of agents in the presence of limited liability. Restricting them-
selves to linear contracts, they show that if the tenant's (agent) crop-share is unconstrained,
2The literature on matching models distinguishes two types of situations. In the rst type, rst analysed
by Gale and Shapley[9], forming the matching does not involve any exchange between the parties, or equiv-
alently, the amount exchanged is exogenously xed. In the second type, called assignment games, proposed
by Shapley and Shubik[23] the parties involved in matching endogenously decide the amount of money to
exchange. Roth and Sotomayor[20] provide an excellent review of the literature of matching models without
and with money. In the present paper we extend the previous models by considering situations where the
parties involved in a matching are linked by a contract (and not only by an exchange of money).
5wealthier tenants receive xed-rent contracts, while poorer tenants receive sharecropping
contracts.3 Also in an economy with a continuum of (heterogenous) participants in both
sides, Legros and Newman[14] present sucient conditions for matchings to be monotone
when utility between partners is not fully transferable. In contrast with the above two pa-
pers, our framework can accommodate the analysis of economies with a few participants as
well as those with a large number of participants. Mookherjee and Ray[16] analyse the op-
timal short term contracts in an innitely repeated interaction among principals and agents
who are randomly matched at each period. Finally, the work of Barros and Macho-Stadler[4]
looks into a situation where several principals compete for an agent. They also nd that the
competition among the principals make the incentive contracts more ecient.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the basic model. We describe
the main results in Section 3. In particular, we characterise the set of stable outcomes. In
the following section we discuss the characteristics of contracts that are signed in a stable
outcome. In Section 5 we propose a sequential mechanism that implements the set of stable
outcomes. In Section 6 we put forward some examples of principal-agent economies where
the ndings t into. In Section 7 we conclude the paper and indicate some avenues for future
research.
2 The Model
2.1 Principals and Agents
We consider an economy with a (nite) set of risk neutral principals, P = fP1; P2; ::::; Png
and a (nite) set of risk neutral agents, A = fA1; A2; ::::; Amg. A principal might be a
landowner, a lender or an employer. An agent is a tenant, a borrower or a worker. Principals
are of identical characteristics. Agents dier with respect to their initial wealth. An agent
3The role of limited liability in tenancy contracts are also analysed extensively by Basu[5] and Sen-
gupta[21]. See also Bhaskar [7], and Ghatak and Pandey [10] for further analyses of optimal contracts in
presence of moral hazard and limited liability.
6Aj has an initial wealth wj, which is known to the principals. Without any loss of generality,
we order the wealth level as w1  w2  ::::  wm  0. The principals and the agents are
matched in pairs and a contract is signed by each pair. We allow for the possibility that a
principal or an agent can seek for an alternative partner and can sign a dierent contract.
Hence, the matching is endogenous rather than being exogenous.
2.2 Projects
When a principal-agent pair is formed,4 the agent operates on a project, chooses eort level
e from the set f0; 1g, and investment K is made, which is nanced entirely by the principal.
An agent incurs a disutility of e when he chooses the eort level e. The eort exerted is not
contractible but the level of investment is.5 Eort and investment inuence the return of
each project which is uncertain. Given an eort level e and investment K, let e(K) be the
probability of the event of success (denoted by S) and 1   e(K), the probability of failure
(denoted by F). Each project generates a return y > 0 in case of success. In case of failure,
the return is 0. We assume (a) 1(K) > 0(K); for all K > 0, (b) 0  e(K)  1; for all
K > 0 and 0(0) = 0 and (c) 0
e(K) > 0 > 00
e(K) for all K > 0 and limK!10
e(K) = 0.
Part (c) guarantees that the solution in K is interior. We denote by M  fP; A; w; g the
market, where w  (w1; :::; wm) denotes the vector of initial wealth of the agents in A and
 represents the technology.
2.3 Contracts and Payos
A principal-agent pair (Pi; Aj) signs a contract, c, which is a three dimensional vector
(S; F; K). We take the convention that the agent keeps the output. Then the rst com-
ponent of the contract, S is the transfer to the principal in the event of success and the
second component, the transfer in case of failure. The third component of c is the level of
investment. Given a contract c = (S; F; K) signed by a pair (Pi; Aj), let ec be dened as
4There is a possibility that some principals and some agents remain unmatched.
5All our ndings remain unaltered even if an agent with positive wealth nances part of the investment.
7the eort that maximises the agent's utility:6
ec = argmax
e
fe(K)(y   S)   (1   e(K))F   eg: (IC)
For a contract c, the eort chosen by the agent will be ec given that the eort is not
contractible. This is the incentive compatibility constraint. Moreover, we normalise the per
unit opportunity cost of nancing a project to 1. Then the expected utilities of the principal
Pi and the agent Aj when they sign the contract c will be:
uPi(A
j; c) = ec(K)S + (1   ec(K))F   K
uAj(Pi; c) = ec(K)(y   S)   (1   ec(K))F   ec:
Notice that we have dened the expected utility of Aj net of the wealth wj. The gross
expected utility of Aj would be uAj(Pi; c) + wj. For future notational convenience, we
denote by cnull = (0; 0; 0), the null contract. Under cnull, uPi(Aj; cnull) = uAj(Pi; cnull) = 0.
We assume that for an agent, signing a contract cnull is equivalent to the situation where
he is not contracted by any principal, i.e., his reservation utility equals 0. Agent's liability
is limited to his current wealth. This imposes restrictions on the set of contracts. Limited
liability implies




The assumption of risk neutrality together with limited liability makes the incentive com-
patibility constraint costly and hence, it gives rise to moral hazard in agent's eort choice.
A sensible contract for a principal-agent pair must satisfy the incentive compatibility and
limited liability constraints. Furthermore, neither an agent nor a principal would accept a
contract with negative expected utility. That is, a contract for a pair (Pi; Aj) has to be
acceptable to each member of the pair. We say that a contract c is acceptable for (Pi; Aj) if
uPi(Aj; c)  0 and uAj(Pi; c)  0. We club all these natural restrictions into the following
denition.7
6Conventionally ec = 1 if both 1 and 0 maximises the following expression.
7Notice that the limited liability constraints are agent specic.
8Definition 1 A contract is feasible for an agent Aj if it satises the restrictions of
limited liability and acceptability.
Denote by X j the set of contracts feasible for agent Aj. From now on we will concentrate
only on feasible contracts.
The incentive compatibility constraint implies that the agent may choose any of the two
eort levels (high or low). In order to deal with interesting situations, we will assume, from
now on, that the output y in case of success is high enough so that it is always optimal
rst, to establish a relationship and second, to set a contract that induces the agent to exert
high eort. Hence, one can substitute the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) by the
following:
(1(K)   0(K))(y   S + F)  1: (IC0)
We will denote by Zj  X j the set of feasible contracts that also satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint (IC0). One particular class of contracts are the principal-agent
contracts, where the principal assumes all the bargaining power. The principal-agent contract




Given the limited liability constraints, the moral hazard problem is typically costly for the
principal, i.e., she earns lower prots compared to the rst best situation, where she does
not face any moral hazard problem. This happens if agent's wealth is below the level which
makes the limited liability constraints no longer binding. Denote by w0 this threshold level
of initial wealth. Next, we show that if the principal has all the bargaining power, she strictly
prefers hiring an agent with higher wealth if the rst best has not already been reached.
Proposition 1 If wj > wk and wj < w0, then uPi(Aj; cj) > uPi(Ak; ck).
Proof See Appendix B. 
92.4 Matching
Principals and agents are matched in pairs and when a pair is formed, a contract is signed.
The following three denitions describe a matching and a relevant outcome of this principal-
agent economy.
Definition 2 A (one-to-one) matching for M is a mapping  : P [ A ! P [ A such
that (i) (Pi) 2 A [ fPig for all Pi 2 P, (ii) (Aj) 2 P [ fAjg for all Aj 2 A and (iii)
(Aj) = Pi if and only if (Pi) = Aj for all (Pi; Aj) 2 P  A.
The denition implies that a matching for a market M is a mapping which species that
either each individual of one side of the market is assigned to another individual of the other
side or, the individual remains alone. We say that the pair (Pi; Aj) is matched under  if
(Pi) = Aj (or, equivalently, (Aj) = Pi).
Definition 3 A menu of contracts C compatible with a matching  for M is a vector
of contracts, C = (c1; :::; cn; c1; :::; cm) such that (a) ci = cj if (Pi) = Aj and cj is feasible
for (Pi; Aj), (b) ci = cnull if (Pi) = Pi and (c) cj = cnull if (Aj) = Aj.
Definition 4 An outcome (; C) for the market M is a matching  and a menu of con-
tracts C compatible with .
The outcomes of the market we describe here are endogenous. This endogeneity has two
aspects. First, the contracts signed by the principals and the agents are endogenous. In the
principal-agent theory, considerable attention has been paid in order to analyse the contracts
that prevail in a given (isolated) principal-agent relationship. The second aspect is that the
matching itself should be endogenous. We will approach this perspective in the same vein
as the matching theory. We require that a reasonable outcome should be immune to the
possibility of being blocked by any principal-agent pair (as well as by any single individual).
Consider an outcome (; C). If there is a principal-agent pair which can sign a feasible
contract such that both the principal and the agent are strictly better-o under the new
10arrangement compared to their situation in the outcome (; C), then such an outcome is not
reasonable. This idea corresponds the notion of stability.
Definition 5 An outcome (; C) for the market M is stable if there does not exist any pair
(Pi; Aj) and any contract c0 2 X j such that uPi(Aj; c0) > uPi((Pi); ci) and uAj(Pi; c0) >
uAj((Aj); cj).
The above denition makes sure that there does not exist any principal-agent pair that can
block the current outcome, signing a feasible contract c0 between them. Moreover, since all
the contracts in a stable outcome are feasible, this implies that a stable outcome is also
individually rational.
3 The Set of Stable Outcomes
In this section we characterise the set of stable outcomes of the market M. We start by
stating two important properties of a stable outcome.
First, all the contracts in a stable outcome are optimal. By optimality we mean that
there is no possibility of improving the utility of one individual in a principal-agent pair
without making the other individual worse-o. The following lemma states the optimality
property.
Lemma 1 All the contracts in a stable outcome are optimal.
Proof Suppose (; C) is stable, but the contract c 2 C signed by Pi and Aj, where
(Aj) = Pi, is not optimal. Then there exists a contract c0, feasible for (Pi; Aj) such
that (i) uPi(Aj; c0) > uPi(Aj; c) and (ii) uAj(Pi; c0) > uAj(Pi; c). In that case (Pi; Aj) will
block (; C) with c0. This contradicts the fact that (; C) is initially stable. 
It is interesting to notice that the optimality of a contract between a principal and an agent
in any stable outcome is guaranteed by the possibility that the same pair can block the initial
11outcome with a dierent contract. Another property of stable outcomes is that no principal
can gain more than any of her counterpart does. The prots of all the principals are equal.
Lemma 2 proves this assertion.
Lemma 2 In any stable outcome (; C), uPi((Pi); ci) = uPk((Pk); ck) for any Pi; Pk 2 P.
Proof Suppose (; C) is a stable outcome and uPi((Pi); ci) > uPk((Pk); ck). We show
that there exists a contract c0 2 C such that (Pk; (Pi)) blocks the outcome with c0. First,
note that (Pi) 2 A, otherwise uPi((Pi); ci) = 0. Suppose ci = (S; F; K) and con-
sider c0 = (S   "; F   "; K) with " > 0.8 It is easy to check that eci = ec0. Hence, for
" small enough, uPk((Pi); c0) = uPi((Pi); ci)   " > uPk((Pk); ck) and u(Pi)(Pk; c0) =
u(Pi)(Pi; ci) + " > u(Pi)(Pi; ci). Therefore, (Pk; (Pi)) blocks (; C) with c0 and hence the
lemma. 
The above lemma states the intuitive property that, when the principals are identical,
they must obtain the same prots in a stable outcome. This property is no longer valid if
we consider some heterogeneity among the principals.
Lemma 1 implies that the contracts in a stable outcome must be optimal. Hence, a
contract signed by a matched pair (Pi; Aj) must maximise the expected utility of one party
taking into account that the other gets at least a certain utility level. One particular class
of optimal contracts are the principal-agent contracts, which have been discussed in Section
2.3.
The utility possibility frontier for any principal-agent pair is the set of utilities generated
by the contracts that solve a programme similar to (P1) where the reservation utility of
the agent can take value not only equal to zero as in (P1), but any number. The same
set of optimal contracts results in if one maximises agent's utility subject to a participation
constraint of the principal (PCP). We will denote by cj(b u) the optimal contract that solves
8In some proofs we will use the notation c   " to refer to the contract (S   "; F   "; K), when c =
(S; F; K).





s.t. uPi(Aj; c)  b u (PCP):
(P2)
Notice that the contract that solves (P2) is acceptable for Aj only if b u is not too high.
More precisely, uAj(Pi; cj(b u))  0 if and only if b u  uPi(Aj; cj). In the following theorems
we characterise completely the set of stable outcomes. The properties that the contracts
in a stable outcome are optimal and that all principals earn equal prots provide a partial
characterisation. These help us complete the description of the set of stable outcomes. We
distinguish among dierent cases. In Theorem 1, we consider the situation where there are
more agents than principals (m > n) in the economy. In Theorem 2, we analyse the situations
where there are same number of principals and agents and there are more principals than
agents. Notice that the two lemmas stated above hold irrespective of the cardinalities of the
set of principals and the set of agents.
Theorem 1 If m > n, then an outcome (; C) is stable for the market M if and only if the
following three conditions hold:
(a) (Pi) 2 A for all Pi 2 P, (Aj) 2 P if wj > wn+1 and (Aj) = Aj if wj < wn,
(b) uPi((Pi); ci) = b u 2 [uPi(An+1; c(n+1)); uPi(An; cn)] for all Pi 2 P, and
(c) cj = cj(b u) if (Aj) 2 P and cj = cnull if (Aj) = Aj.
Proof We rst prove that (a)-(c) are necessary conditions for any stable outcome.
(a) Suppose rst, that in a stable outcome (; C) any principal Pi is not matched. Then
uPi((Pi); ci) = 0. Now consider an agent Aj who is initially unmatched under . Then
the contract cj   " 2 Zj yields strictly higher payos to both Pi and Aj. Hence, (Pi; Aj)
with cj   " blocks (; C). Second we show that Aj is matched if wj > wn+1. Suppose,
on the contrary, that Aj is unmatched under  and hence, uAj(Aj; cj) = 0. Because of
the previous proof, under  there are n agents matched. Suppose, Ak is a matched agent
such that wk  wn+1. Following Proposition 1, u(Ak)(Aj; cj) > u(Ak)(Ak; ck). Given
13that uAk((Ak); ck)  0 (since, the contract is feasible), u(Ak)(Ak; ck)  u(Ak)(Ak; ck) <
u(Ak)(Aj; cj). Take c0 = cj   ", with " small enough. It is easy to see that ((Ak); Aj)
with the contract c0 will block the outcome which is a contradiction. For the last part of
(a), suppose on the contrary that Aj is matched under  and wj < wn. Since n agents are
matched, take Ak such that this agent is not matched in a stable outcome and wk > wn.
Applying the same argument as before, it is easy to show that ((Aj); Ak) with the contract
ck   " will block the current outcome.
(b) We know that in all the stable outcomes the prots of the principals must be equal.
Denote by b u the common prot of the principals. First we will show that in a stable outcome
(; C), b u  uPi(An+1; c(n+1)). Suppose on the contrary, b u < uPi(An+1; c(n+1)). From part
(a) of the theorem we know that any agent with less wealth than wn cannot be matched in a
stable outcome. Suppose this is An+1 and consider any principal Pi. Then there is a contract
c0 = c(n+1)   ", with " small enough, such that (1) uPi(An+1; c0) = uPi(An+1; c(n+1))   " >
b u and (2) uAn+1(Pi; c0)  " > 0 = uAn+1((An+1); cn+1). Hence, (Pi; An+1) blocks the
outcome. Second, from Proposition 1 we know that uPi(Aj; cj) > uPi(Ak; ck) if and only
if wj > wk. In a stable outcome (; C), an agent with wealth greater than wn+1, say An
is matched with some principal, say Pi. Then uPi(An; ci) = b u > uPi(An; cn) implies that
uAn(Pi; ci) < uAn(Pi; cn). This is not possible in a stable outcome.
(c) Let (; C) be a stable outcome. By Lemma 1, any contract c 2 C is optimal and cj is
such a contract. So, given the stability of (; C), cj = cj(b u) if (Aj) 2 P.
We now prove that any outcome (; C) satisfying (a)-(c) is indeed stable. Suppose
(Aj) 2 P and consider any principal Pi who, because of part (a), is matched. Clearly,
(Pi; Aj) cannot block the outcome with any contract. Indeed, there does not exist a con-
tract such that Pi gets more than b u and Aj gets more than uAj((Aj); cj) since cj(b u) is
optimal by (c). Now suppose (Aj) = Aj and choose any arbitrary Pi (we can do so, since
all principals have the same prot). By (a), we know that wj  wn+1. Then the maximum
utility Pi can get by contracting Aj such that uAj(::)  0 is uPi(Aj; cj)  uPi(An+1; c(n+1)).
Given that b u  uPi(An+1; c(n+1)) (because of (d)), there is no room for the pair (Pi; Aj) to
14block (; C). 
We have already established that in a stable outcome all the principals get the same utility.
When there are too many agents, this uniform utility cannot be less than the surplus that
can be created by the richest unmatched agent and it cannot be more than the surplus that
can be created by the poorest matched agent. In the following theorem, we restate Theorem
1 in cases where there are same number of principals and agents and where there are more
principals than agents.
Theorem 2 (i) If m = n, then an outcome (; C) is stable for the market M if and only
if the following three conditions hold:
(a) All principals and agents are matched,
(b) uPi((Pi); ci) = b u 2 [0; uPi(An; cn)] for all Pi 2 P, and
(c) cj = cj(b u) for any Aj.
(ii) If m < n, then an outcome (; C) is stable for the market M if and only if the following
three conditions hold:
(a) Only m principals and all the agents are matched,
(b) uPi((Pi); ci) = 0 for all Pi 2 A, and
(c) cj = cj(0) for any Aj.
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 1. 
Part (i) describes the situation where there are as many principals as agents. Since all
principals consume the same utility, they can obtain as low as zero utility but no more
than the maximal utility that can be consumed by the principal matched with the poorest
agent. Part (ii) concerns the situation where there is an abundance of principals. Since each
principal gets the same utility level and since the unmatched ones necessarily obtain zero
utility, each principal shall consume a zero utility too.
The above theorems characterise the stable outcomes for this principal-agent economy.
15First important thing to note is the optimality property of the contracts in the stable out-
come. Optimality in this market has in fact two aspects. The contracts signed are optimal
for the parties involved. This was a property already established in Lemma 1. On the other
hand, part (a) in both theorems makes sure that the matching itself is optimal too. This is
the case because, in a stable outcome, all the individuals in the short side of the market are
matched and, when there are more agents than principals, only the best (wealthier) agents
are the ones who get contracted.
The second important property is that the prots of the principals are equal. In a
stable outcome there emerges competition among the principals for the wealthier agents. In
particular, when there are more principals than agents (Theorem 2(ii)), the prot of each
principal is driven down to zero.
Third, in a stable outcome, all the agents whose wealth level is above the wealth of the
poorest agent contracted obtain a strictly higher utility than that under a principal-agent
contract. In fact, there are stable outcomes where the same is true even for the poorest
agent contracted. To understand the reason for this property, notice that had the agents
been symmetric, i.e., if they had equal initial wealth, and they were large in number, the
principals would assume all the bargaining power. In this case, the stable outcome would
involve a principal-agent contract for each agent hired. The asymmetry among the agents
does not let the principals appropriate all the incremental surplus generated in a principal-
agent relationship, even when there are more agents than principals. Rather, the competition
among principals makes the incremental surplus accrue to the agents. This competition is
even more acute when there is an abundance of principals. In this case, it follows from
Theorem 2 that the entire surplus generated in a relation accrues to the agent.
Finally, as is usual in the classical matching models, the set of stable outcomes in our
economy has a nice structure. First, if (; C) is a stable outcome and 0 is an ecient
matching, then (0; C) is also stable. That is, the set of stable outcome is the Cartesian
product of the set of ecient matchings and a set of menus of optimal contracts. Second,
if one stable outcome (; C) is better for an agent than another stable outcome (0; C0),
16then (; C) is better than (0; C0) for all the agents hired and worse for all the principals
matched. In particular, out of all the stable outcomes there exists a stable outcome which
is the best from the principals' point of view and similarly for the agents. In this economy,
these two extreme points in the set of stable outcomes correspond to the outcomes in which
the utilities of the principals are b u = uPi(An;cn) and b u = uPi(An+1;c(n+1)).9 The rst point
is the principals' optimal stable outcome (we refer to this as P-optimum), while the second
is the agents' optimal stable outcome (call this A-optimum).
In our framework, transactions occur via contracts. The major dierence between this
economy and a market where transactions go through prices (as in the assignment game
analysed by Shapley and Shubik[23]) is that the total surplus produced in a particular
relation does depend on the way in which the surplus is shared between the principal and
the agent and on the design of the contract. The size of the surplus that accrues to the
agent inuences the extent to which the limited liability constraints are binding and hence
the total surplus.
4 Characteristics of the Contracts in a Stable Outcome
In this section, we provide the characteristics of the contracts signed in a stable outcome.
We have already shown that any such contract solves the maximisation programme (P2).
Now we turn on to analyse the characteristics of the solution to this programme. We will
develop the analysis under the following assumption. In the appendix we comment on the
qualitative changes if the opposite assumption holds.10
Assumption 1 1(K)0
0(K)   0
1(K)0(K) > 0 for all K > 0.
Assumption 1 implies that the derivative of
0
1 with respect to K is positive. That is, the
higher the level of investment, the lower is the dierence between 0 and 1, and hence, the
9If wn = wn+1, then the common utility consumed by all principals, b u, is equal to uPi(An;cn) =
uPi(An+1;c(n+1)). Moreover, any agent obtains the same utility in all the stable outcomes.
10The appendix provides a more complete analysis of the solution to (P2).
17inuence of making a high eort.




0)y = 1: (1)
In the rst-best contract, K0 is the level of investment that would be chosen if there was
no moral hazard problem, or equivalently, if the limited liability would not have any bite.
In order to analyse the programme (P2), one can identify two disjoint ranges of values of
wj where the optimal solutions are dierent. First, for a very high level of agent's wealth
both the incentive compatibility constraint and limited liability constraint (in the event of
failure) are not binding.11 This is equivalent to saying that there is no moral hazard problem.
The threshold level of initial wealth, w(b u), beyond which the optimal investment reaches its
rst-best level K0 depends on the utility of the principal, b u, and is:
w(b u)   1(K
0)y + K




For low levels of initial wealth, wj  w(b u), both the incentive constraint and the limited
liability constraint bind. In this region the moral hazard problem becomes important and
hence, the optimal investment is lower than its rst-best level. The optimal investment
b K(wj; b u) is implicitly dened by the following equation:





Given Assumption 1, the optimal investment increases with agents' wealth. The optimal





b K(wj; b u) if wj < w(b u)
K0 if wj  w(b u):
We also describe in brief the characteristics of the state contingent transfers. Notice that, for
wj  w(b u), any combination of (S; F) that satises the constraints can be candidate for
11One can easily check that the limited liability constraint in the event of success is automatically satised
for the problem and that S can be calculated from the (PCP).
18the optimum. One possible optimum corresponds to F = wj. In case where the constraints
(IC0) and (LF) are binding (for wj  w(b u)), F = wj is also an optimum. Using the
participation constraint of the principal, one can then easily calculate the optimal transfer





b u+ b K(wj;b u) (1 1( b K(wj;b u)))wj
1( b K(wj;b u)) if wj < w(b u)
b u+K0 (1 1(K0))wj
1(K0) if wj  w(b u)
Once we know the characteristics of the solutions to program (P2), we use theorems 1 and 2
to provide a description of the contracts in a stable outcome. Consider rst a situation with
many agents where the wealth of most of them is zero, i.e., m > n and wn = wn+1 = 0. In this
economy, the contracts signed in all the stable outcomes are the same. The contract signed
by the hired agents with zero wealth will be the corresponding principal-agent contract, while
the contract signed by the richer agents will correspond to the solution of program (P2),
for b u = uPi(An;cn). Figure 1 depicts the level of investments in the stable outcome.12 For
comparison, the diagram also includes the level of investments K(wj) that would be made
if all the agents would sign a principal-agent contract. In this gure, K is the minimum
level that would be invested by the agents with very low level of wealth (say, less than w).
The investment level is closer to the rst-best level K0 as the wealth of an agent is higher.
That is, the productive eciency of the relationship increases with the agent's wealth. The
investment level coincides with the rst-best level if the agent, say agent A1, is rich enough,
i.e., w1  w(uPi(An;cn)). It is worth noting also that these investments are always higher
than those under principal-agent contracts, unless the agent's wealth is very large, w  w0.
For the same economy, Figure 2 depicts agents' net and gross utility levels (the common
principals' utility is uPi(An;cn)). Agents' net utility increases with the wealth level (unless
the level of wealth is already above w(uPi(An;cn))). The utility of wealthier agents is not
12For sake of tangibility, all the gures are drawn for 1(K) = K
1+K and 0(K) = K
2+K. Our results,











































b K(wn; uPi(An+1; c(n+1)))
Ks(wj)
w1 w2 w3
36only higher because of the initial wealth levels. They also prot from the increase in the
surplus due to the more ecient (i.e., closer to the rst-best) contracts.
For completeness, Figure 3 depicts the set of investment levels in the stable outcomes when
m > n, wn > wn+1, and wn+1 is large. The line corresponding to the level of investments
in a particular stable outcome, say Ks(wj) is quite similar to that in Figure 1 (although
it starts from a level higher than K). This line will be placed at a higher (or a lower)
position depending if we are in a stable outcome closer to (or farther from) the A-optimum.
In particular, the lowest line (that starts from K(wn)) corresponds to the investment levels
in the P-optimum.
The graphical representation of an economy with more principals than agents is very similar
to that in gures 1 and 2. The levels of investment and of net and gross utilities are as in
gures 1 and 2, with the only dierence that they all start at a higher level than K and w.
5 Implementing the Set of Stable Outcomes
In this section we further argue about stability as a reasonable solution concept for the market
we analyse. We show that the set of stable outcomes that we have characterised in theorems
1 and 2 are also the equilibrium outcomes of a very simple and natural non-cooperative
interaction between the principals and the agents. The simple mechanism that we propose,
called  A, is a two-stage game where in the rst stage each agent proposes a contract. In the
second stage of the game, each principal contracts an agent.13 Formally, at the rst stage
13The proposed mechanism adapts to our framework the mechanism suggested by Alcalde, P erez-Castrillo
and Romero-Medina[2]. The two main dierences are that the participants now sign contracts, more complex
than a salary as in the previous paper, and it is a one-to-one matching model which imposes some additional
rigidities on the working of the mechanism.
20of the mechanism, agents send their messages simultaneously. The message of each agent
is an element of the set of feasible contracts. A message sj 2 X j of agent Aj should be
understood as the contract he demands. At the second stage, knowing the messages of the
agents, each principal Pi sends a message si 2 A[fPig. A message of a principal should be
understood as the agent she wants to hire or she wants to stay unmatched. The outcome
function g(:) associates to each vector of messages, s = (s1; :::; sn; s1; :::; sm) a matching,
s, and a menu of contracts, C(s), such that s(Aj) is the smallest indexed principal of the






sj if s(Aj) 2 P
cnull ;otherwise:
The natural solution concept used here is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We will analyse the
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in pure strategies (SPE).
Theorem 3 (i) When n 6= m, the set of SPE outcomes of the mechanism  A coincides with
the set of stable outcomes for the market M.
(ii) When n = m, the set of SPE outcomes of the mechanism  A coincides with the set of
agents' optimal stable outcomes for the market M
Proof See Appendix E. 
From the point of view of implementation, the above theorem shows that one can propose
a very simple mechanism which makes it possible to implement the set of stable outcomes
(or the agents' optimal stable outcomes) of this principal-agent economy.
6 An Application: A Landowner-Tenant Economy
In a seminal work, Shetty[24] shows that wealth dierences among tenants play a key role
in determining the credit contracts when there exists a possibility of default on the rental
21commitments. Dierence in initial wealth implies dierence in liability of the tenants. Hence,
in the case where there is signicant moral hazard problem due to limited liability, wealthier
tenants are always preferred for a better contractual structure, since possibility of default is
less with wealthier tenants. Our results can be used to analyse similar situations when a set
of landowners interacts with a set of tenants through tenancy relations. One feature is to
note that the kind of contracts we use can often be observed in the less developed economies.
It is very common that the same person acts as landowner-cum-moneylender in the villages
by leasing land and lending money to the same person (here, the tenant). The contracts
described for the market M also capture these components. The state contingent transfers,
(S; F) are the payments made to the landowners and K is the amount borrowed from the
landowners that is invested eventually in land. In this economy, the tenants cannot seek loans
from the formal credit sector due to lack of sucient collateral, while the landowners can.
Consequently, the landowners become the only sources of credit for the hapless borrowers.
With these interpretations, our results imply:
(i) In a stable outcome, all the contracts signed among landowners and tenants are opti-
mal and all the landowners and only the wealthier tenants are matched. All the landowners
earn the same prot and the contracts maximise the expected utility of the tenants for
the common prot level of the landowners. Wealthier is the tenant, the more ecient the
contract he signs (closer to rst-best). The above ndings also conform to the ndings of
Shetty[24], and Ray and Singh [19].
(ii) The investments made in a stable outcome are, in fact, closer to rst-best than
those that would be implemented if the tenants would sign principal-agent contracts. As
landowners compete for the wealthier tenants, they are compelled to oer these tenants
better contracts in order to attract them. Since the tenants obtain higher utility, the limited
liability constraint is less stringent and hence the investment level approaches the rst best.
This phenomenon is described in gures 1 and 2. This comparison is relevant because the
principal-agent contracts are the contracts that would have been oered, for example, if the
landowners would collude.
22The property highlighted in (ii) has important implications with respect to distributive
(in)equality and eciency. It suggests that for a very low level of aggregate wealth, more is
the inequality in the distribution of tenant's wealth, higher is the total investment and more
ecient the relationship. Indeed, as the wealth level of the poorest agent hired decreases,
the market power of the other agents increases. Consequently, these other agents take more
prot from a relationship and the contract terms are more ecient (i.e., the investment level
is closer to the rst-best.).
From a normative point of view, the analysis suggests that if the public authority has
some money to distribute which could serve as collateral in tenancy relations, it may need to
induce inequality among the tenants in order to increase both the eciency of the contracts
and the utility of (some of) the tenants. Suppose all the tenants have no initial wealth. If
the public authority distributes to every tenant a small amount (less than w in Figure 1),
then in the stable outcome, all the tenants will sign the principal-agent contracts investing
a level K which is the same they would do with zero wealth. Hence, the eciency of the
relationship will remain the same as that prior to the distribution. Moreover, the gross
utility of all the tenants hired will be the same as before. That is, the landowners will
appropriate the additional amount distributed, which was intended to improve the welfare
of the tenants. On the other hand, if the public authority distributes the money among a
few tenants (a number smaller than the number of landowners), then the contracts signed
by these tenants will be more ecient than before, and their gross utility will increase by
more than the additional money they receive. Hence, targeting a small group rather than
all the tenants improves the welfare of this group and overall eciency.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we model a principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching market and
characterise completely the set of stable outcomes of this economy. As we have mentioned
earlier, our model can be seen as a generalisation of the assignment game described by
23Shapley and Shubik[23]. Our ndings can easily be applied to various examples of principal-
agent economies. We have already mentioned two of them in the previous section. The main
task of this paper lies in suggesting a general (competitive) equilibrium model of a principal-
agent economy. Using the restriction of limited liability should be taken as a very simple way
to tackle incentive problems. This paper also consolidates stability as a reasonable solution
concept. In this regard, we show that our results are not only the outcome of a cooperative
game, but can be reached through very simple non-cooperative interactions between the
principals and the agents.
Our paper leaves several avenues open to further research. First, we have assumed that
the principals are identical. Although some of the conclusions of our analyses can imme-
diately be extended to apply to economies with heterogenous principals, the characteristics
of the contracts signed in the stable outcomes can be quite dierent from those identied
in the current work. On the one hand, the results that the contracts signed in a stable
outcome are optimal and the matching itself is ecient (in the sense that it maximises the
total surplus) hold also in a framework with heterogenous principals. On the other, there
is no unique way to model the dierences among the principals and the contracts will be
dierent depending on the type of heterogeneity one would like to introduce. Second, ours is
a one-to-one matching model. If we consider the situation where several independent agents
are matched with each principal, then the conclusions will remain unchanged. But these
will be dierent in a more interesting situation where the action of an agent is dependent
on that of others. This kind bears similarity with the agency problem in a multi-agent situ-
ation. A natural way to analyse this would be to make use of a many-to-one matching model.
Appendix
A. The Principal-Agent Contracts
24We solve for the optimal principal-agent contract for a pair (Pi; Aj):
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
maximise
fS;F;Kg
uPi = 1(K)S + (1   1(K))F   K
subject to (PC) 1(K)(y   S + F)   F  1
(IC0) [1(K)   0(K)](y   S + F)  1
(LS) S  y + wj
(LF) F  wj:
(P1)
At the optimum, (IC0) binds, so we write the constraint with equality.14 Using this, one can replace S in
the objective function and the other three constraints. Moreover, if (PC) and (LF) are satised, (LS) also
holds. Hence, the above programme reduces to the following:
8
> > > > > > <





1(K) 0(K) + F   K
subject to (PC0)
1(K)
1(K) 0(K)   F   1  0
(LF) wj   F  0:
(P10)








(1   0)2 = 0 (2)
















  F   1  0 (6)
wj   F  0 (7)
1; 2  0 (8)
Now we study dierent regions where the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be satised. For simplicity, we develop
the analysis when 0
10   10
0 < 0.
Case 1: 1 = 2 = 0 (Both the constraints are non binding)
14To be more precise, (IC0) does not bind if wj is very high, that is in the region where the limited liability
constraints do not play any role and the rst best contract is signed. This corresponds to Case 2 in the
analysis that follows.
15The hypotheses on 1(K) and y make sure the optimal K must be interior and it satises the rst-order
conditions. The corner solution for F is explicitly taken into account.
25From (3), we can see that this case is not possible.
Case 2: 1 > 0; 2 = 0 ((LF) is non-binding and (PC0) is binding)
From (3), 1 = 1: Then from (2), we have y0
1(K0) = 1, where K0 is the rst-best level of investment. Using





  1  w
0:
Hence, if wj  w0 a candidate for optimal solution exists involving K = K0. In particular, an optimal
payment vector is (S = y + wj   1+w
j
1(K0); F = wj).
Case 3: 1 = 0, 2 > 0 ((LF) is binding and (PC0) is non-binding)
From (3), 2 = 1. Then (2) implicitly denes the level of optimum investment K,
y0




(1(K)   0(K))2 = 0:
From (LF), we also have F = wj. Moreover, S is determined by (IC0) as S = y +wj   1
1(K) 0(K). And





  1  w:
That is, the previous contract can only be a candidate if wj  w.
Case 4: 1 > 0, 2 > 0 (Both the constraints are binding)
From (LF), F = wj. Then (PC0) denes the optimal K as an implicit function of wj. Denote this by
K(wj), which must satisfy the following condition
1(K(wj))
1(K(wj))   0(K(wj))
= wj + 1: (9)
Finally, S is determined by (IC0). Previously found F, S and K(wj) are indeed the candidates for optimum
if the Lagrange multiplier, 1, implicitly dened by (2) lies in the interval [0, 1] (so that constraints (3) and
(8) are satised). Given that 0
10   10
0 < 0, 1 < 1 if and only if
y0
1(K(wj))   1 > 0 ) K(wj) < K0:
Again using 0
10   10
0 < 0, K(wj) < K0 is optimal if
1(K0)
1(K0)   0(K0)
< wj + 1 ) wj < w0:
Similarly, 1 > 0 if and only if
y0




(1(K(wj))   0(K(wj)))2 < 0:
26The above inequality implies K(wj) > K )
1(K)
1(K) 0(K) < 1 + wj ) wj > w. Hence, the optimal con-
tract corresponds to the solution found in Case 3 when wj < w, is the candidate found in Case 4 when
w < wj < w0, and it is the rst-best contract of Case 2 when w0  wj.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
We are to show that if wj > wk in the region wj < w0, then uPi(Aj; cj) > uPi(Ak; ck). From the
previous section one can write the value function v(wj) = uPi(Aj; cj). Using the Envelope theorem, we get
v0(wj) = 2 > 0 and hence the proposition.
C. Contracts in a Stable Outcome
Let us rewrite (P2):
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
maximise
fS;F;Kg
uAj = 1(K)(y   S)   (1   1(K))F   1
subject to (PCP) 1(K)S + (1   1(K))F   K  b u
(IC0) [1(K)   0(K)](y   S + F)  1
(LS) S  y + wj
(LF) F  wj:
(P2)
As we have pointed out in the paper, this programme is individually rational for the agent only if b u 
uPi(Aj; cj). Denote by wmin(b u) the level of wealth such that b u is the utility of a principal that hires an agent
with this wealth under a principal-agent contract. Programme (P2) is only well dened for wj  wmin(b u).
At the optimum, (PCP) binds. Hence, one can substitute for S in the objective function and the rest of
the constraints. Also, if both (IC0) and (LF) hold, then (LS) becomes redundant. Then one has the above
programme reduced as the following:
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
maximise
fF;Kg
1(K)y   b u   K   1
subject to (IC00) 1(K)y  
1(K)
1(K) 0(K) + F   K   b u  0
(LF) F  wj:
(P20)
Let 1 and 2 be the Lagrange multipliers for (IC00) and (LF), respectively. The Kuhn-Tucker (rst-order)
27conditions are
y0
1   R + 1

y0



































wj   F  0 (15)
1; 2  0 (16)
Now we study dierent regions for the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to be satised.
Case 1: 1 = 0; 2 > 0 ((LF) is binding and (IC00), non-binding)
Using (11), one can see that this case is not possible.
Case 2: 1 > 0; 2 = 0 ((LF) is non-binding and (IC00), binding)
From (11), it is clear that this case is not possible either.
Case 3: 1 = 2 = 0 (Both the constraints are non-binding)
From (10), K = K0, the rst best level of investment.The payment made to the principal in case of failure,





1(K0) are optimal. From (IC00)








Case 4: 1 > 0; 2 > 0 (Both the constraints are binding)
In this case, F = wj and optimal investment is a function of wj, b K(wj; b u), that is implicitly dened by the
condition




Notice that, from (10), for K  K0, y0






(1(K) 0(K))2  0. From the above expression,
this immediately implies that b K(:) is increasing in wj. The previous values of F, S and K are optimal
solutions to the above programme if the multipliers 1 and 2 dened in equations (10) and (11) satisfy (16),
i.e., they are non-negative. Notice that (10) implies 2 > 0 if and only if 1 > 0. To check when 1 > 0,
28notice that if wj > w(b u), then it is necessary that
wj =  1( b K(wj; b u))y + b K(wj; b u) + b u +
1( b K(wj; b u))
1( b K(wj; b u))   0( b K(wj; b u))
>  1(K
0)y + K









b K(wj; b u) if wj < w(b u)





b u+ b K(w
j;b u) (1 1( b K(w
j;b u)))w
j





1(K0) if wj  w(b u)
and F = wj
Here we also want to prove that for any level of wj  wmin(b u), b K(wj)  K(wj). First of all we know that,
b K(wj) > K. Comparing (9) and (17), it is clear that proving b K(wj)  K(wj) is equivalent to showing that
1( b K)y   b K   b u  1. Suppose that wmin(b u)  w. Then b u is given by




min(b u)   K:
Using the above together with (6), it is easy to see that 1( b K)y  b K b u > 1. This also proves that w(b u)  w0.
We now do the same considering wmin(b u) > w. Notice that, in this case b u = 1(K(wmin(b u)))y K(wmin(b u)).
Also , [1( b K)y  b K] [1(K(wmin(b u)))y K(wmin(b u))] > 0, since investment is increasing in wealth. These
previous two facts imply the above assertion that b K(wj)  K(wj) for all wj  wmin(b u).
D. The Case when 1(K)0
0(K) < 0
1(K)0(K)
In the paper we have analysed our model under the assumption that 10
0 > 0
10. We also asserted
that, all the qualitative results of our model would hold good under the assumption that 10
0 < 0
10.
Under this assumption, the ndings in Appendix A imply K > K(wj) > K0 and K(wj) is decreasing for
wj 2 (w; w0). The reason behind this is the following. When 1(K) is increasing relative to 0(K), for a
high level of initial investment, giving incentives is much easier. Because of this, for low level of wealth, the
principal gives over incentives to the agent by lending more money (equivalently, the optimal investment
is higher). Similarly, under this assumption, the ndings of Appendix C imply that b K(wj; b u) > K0 for
wj > w(b u).
E. Proof of Theorem 4
29Consider m > n. First we prove that each SPE outcome is stable. We do that through several claims.
(a) At any SPE, the contracts accepted are (among) the ones yielding the highest utility to the principals.
Otherwise, a principal accepting a contract that yields lower utility would have incentives to switch to a
better contract that has not already been taken. (b) At any SPE, all the contracts that are accepted provide
the same utility to all the principals. Otherwise, on the contrary, consider one of the (at most n 1) contracts
that gives the maximum utility to the principals. If one of the agents slightly decreases the payments oered
at the rst stage, his contract will still be accepted at any Nash equilibrium (NE) of the second-stage game
for the new set of oers (because of (a)). (c) At any SPE, precisely n contracts are accepted. To see this,
suppose on the contrary that at most n   1 contracts are accepted. Then there is a (unmatched) principal
with zero utility. This is not possible since (b) holds. (d) The contracts that are nally accepted are those
oered by the wealthiest agents. Suppose wk > wj and the contract oered by Aj is accepted, but not
the one by Ak. Then Ak can oer a slightly better (for the principals) contract than sj. Given (a)-(c),
this new contract will be accepted at any NE of the second-stage game. This is a contradiction. (e) All
the contracts signed are optimal. Otherwise, an agent oering a non-optimal contract could improve it for
both (any principal and himself). This new contract will certainly be among the n best contracts for the
principals (since the previous contract was) and hence, will be accepted at any SPE outcome. (f) Finally,
any SPE outcome is stable. It only remains to prove that the common utility level of the principals at an
SPE, denoted by b u, lies in [uPi(An+1; c(n+1)); uPi(An; cn)]. First, b u  uPi(An; cn), because otherwise,
some agents would be better-o by not oering any contract. Secondly, b u  uPi(An+1; c(n+1)) for agent
An+1 not to have incentives to propose a contract that would have been accepted.
We now prove that any stable outcome can be supported by an SPE strategy. Let (; C) be a stable
allocation where each principal gets utility b u. Consider the following strategies of each agent Aj for all j





c(Aj) if (Aj) 2 P
b c s.t. uPi(Aj; b c) = b u ; for any Pi 2 P; otherwise:
And b si = (Pi) if b s is played in the rst stage. Otherwise, principals select any agent compatible with an
NE in pure strategies given any other message s sent in the rst period. These strategies constitute an
SPE yielding the stable outcome (; C). To see this, notice that given any message sj 6= b sj, principals play
their NE strategies. Given that b s is played in the rst stage, by deviating any principal Pi she cannot gain
more than b u. This is true because any contract oered in the rst stage yields the same utility b u to any
principal. Now consider deviations by the agents. Given that b u  uPi(An+1; c(n+1)), by stability, there
does not exist any contract that would be oered by an unmatched agent that guarantees him a positive
30utility while yielding at least b u to a principal. Hence, unmatched agents do not have incentives to deviate.
Also, given the eciency of the contracts in a stable allocation, there does not exist a dierent contract that
a matched agent could oer at which he could have strictly improved while still guaranteeing at least b u to
the principals. If there is a plethora of contracts that yields utility b u to the principals, it is easy to check
that there is no NE of the game at which a contract providing utility lower than b u is accepted by a principal.
Hence, the matched agents do not also have any incentive to deviate from b s.
The proof when m  n is easier than before and follows similar arguments. To prove that each SPE
yields stable outcomes where principals obtain zero prots, it is sucient to check that the following three
claims hold. (a) At any SPE, the contracts accepted are (among) the ones yielding the highest utility to
the principals. (b) At any SPE, precisely m contracts are accepted and they provide zero utility to all the
principals. (c) All the contracts signed are optimal.
To prove that the stable outcomes (the agents' optimal, if m  n) can be supported by an SPE strategy,
let (; C) be a stable allocation where each principal gets utility b u. Consider the following strategies of each
agent Aj for all j and of each principal Pi for all i:
b sj = cj(0) for any Aj
And b si = (Pi) if b s is played in the rst stage. Otherwise, principals select any agent compatible with an
NE in pure strategies given any other message s sent in the rst period.
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